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πολίτης δ’ ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ 
ἀρχῆς.1
 
 
In a time of a pressing crisis, such as the one we are living today, a need for a resolute 
assessment is imposed upon us. The crisis itself requires us that we somehow become 
critical in order to foresee and judge its hidden turns and twists, which are inevitably 
on their way. We are to be reminded here that the term “crisis [κρίσις]” is a Greek 
Introduction 
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term used in the ancient medical sciences and signifies a “turning point [μεταβολὴ]” 
of a disease, sudden change for better or worse.”2
 
 Indeed, we often neglect the fact 
that a crisis affirms a state of illness, which nonetheless opens itself to the coming of 
both a recovery and an exacerbation. As a state of disorder, a crisis is a liminal 
circumstance, an aporia par excellence, not something static but a contorted transition 
that splits itself into itself and its exact opposite. As a judgment on a disturbing order 
of affairs, it is a discordant recognition that undecidedly affirms a division of fixed 
affirmations. 
It is not a surprise, then, that our gross negligence has decidedly made us unable to 
see the coming of sick economics, austerity measures, and structural reforms. For 
many years, we have failed to foresee the state of upcoming crises as a state of 
quagmire that does not provide a solid ground for assured decisions. We have 
eviscerated any sense of doubt that any type of rigorous thinking brings about, and we 
have surrendered our political economy in general to false promises of predictable, 
foreseeable, and estimable fortunes. For example, we have uncritically relied on the 
science of econometrics to avoid financial sickness and formulate healthy policy 
decisions. Broadly speaking, traditional econometric theory proceeds by (a) stating an 
economic theory as a hypothesis, (b) specifying the mathematical model of the 
economic theory, (c) specifying the econometric model of the theory, (d) obtaining 
data, (e) estimating the parameters of the econometric model, (f) testing the initial 
economic model, (g) forecasting or predicting, if the chosen model does not refute the 
theory under consideration, (h) using the model for policy purposes, and, finally, (i) 
choosing among competing models.3 In a few words, the science of econometrics 
adds abstract mathematical content to all kind of economic theories, allowing, thus, 
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for newly formed and hybrid economic-mathematical structures to be tested 
empirically and used for policy control. We have even pursued a totalizing 
quantification of indecision, uncertainty, and risk, and we have designed calculating 
models that reduce moments of crises into “standard deviations” that are predicted 
and restricted by probabilistic assessments.  
This type of uncritical reliance on natural sciences and, in particular, pure 
mathematics is exactly what Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology and one 
of the most recognizable philosophers of the previous century, called “crisis [Krisis].” 
This type of crisis does not just refer to the measurable collapse of monetary 
economies as it is understood and circulated in today’s media parlance. It is, as 
Husserl understands it, the overall denial of European humanity to question the hidden 
presuppositions that underlie scientific and philosophical thinking. 
Phenomenology and the Crisis of Modern Scientific Culture  
 
In his later diatribes, collected in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the modern European world, in its agonizing 
struggle to reduce all scientific disciplines to a positivistic model that is self-
proclaimed as purely fact-finding and objective, has lead itself to the “emergence of a 
set of world-enigmas which were unknown to earlier times,” which is none other than 
the appearance of “the enigma of psychological subject matter and method.” 4  
Undoubtedly, Husserl’s diagnosis of the modern crisis is quite complicated and 
multilateral. On the one hand, modern philosophy, while it attempts to preserve the 
ancient Greek spirit of investigation, takes a sudden turn towards a novel worldview in 
which theory is totalized as formal abstraction. In its theoretical stance, modern 
philosophy is grasped as the universal knowledge of world and humans, with 
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“universal validity” operating as the grounding necessity of all knowledge. Elaborated 
initially by Descartes, this new type of inquiry claims an apodictic methodology, 
formalizes a model of absolute but interrelated truths, and practices an unending but 
rationally ordered progress. Accordingly, the modern thinking subject is certain that 
she can liberate herself from her old prejudices, fully discern intrinsic human reason 
and its founding principles, and even envisage absolute freedom per se. In this 
context, the human subject strives for a presupposition-less grounding of herself and 
her world. On the other hand, the establishment of modern philosophy as mathesis 
universalis gives a legitimate ground for modern sciences to adopt a “natural 
attitude.” In particular, modern sciences rationalize the world into a naturalized space 
that is thoroughly objectified: observed, manipulated, formulated, and verified 
endlessly in infinity. The methodology of modern sciences implies the 
superimposition of an ideal universe of abstract signs over the realm of the human 
world. It presupposes an a priori geometrical space where entities are “pure” 
configurations. The modern scientist idealizes “pure models” and abstracts from 
everything subjective to constitutive her factual, objective world. 
 
For Husserl, the modern scientist’s stance towards nature—an attitude that aims to 
provide a pure and presupposition-less grounding of the human subject and her world 
as she is found in her world while, at the same time, abstracting, removing and 
alienating herself from her world—remains highly paradoxical and effects an 
enigmatic distortion of scientific thinking as such. By searching for a presupposition-
less principle that grounds a thorough and systematic knowledge of the human subject 
and her world, the modern scientist takes for granted and neglects the most evident 
fact of all: the human subject is unconditionally bounded with a world. In effect, the 
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modern scientist necessarily fails to make the very genesis of the scientific attitude 
from within the world into a problem. In other words, the human world remains an 
enigma for modern sciences because scientific thinking as such has always and 
already been unfolded within the terrain of a human world, which is in every case un-
thematically pre-given. Husserl’s diagnosis here is that the crisis of modern sciences 
and its rippling effects are situated well within the very root of scientific thought; 
modern science is distorted because it is conditioned by its founding principles to be 
so. 
In order to overcome this critical stalemate, Husserl suggests an orientation towards a 
different viewpoint, a sudden change of attitudes, an abrupt judgment of a sort that 
interrupts and upsets the scientific mindset and penetrates into its unseen conditions. 
The Husserlian judgment reconsiders the human world as the pre-given correlation 
between the human and the world. He names this a priori predicament as 
“subjectivity.” He explains: “Only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity—and 
specifically the subjectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its 
content and in all its prescientific and scientific modes, and into the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ of the rational accomplishments—can make objective truth comprehensible and 
arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning of the world.”
Overcoming the Crisis through rethinking Subjectivity and World 
5
 
 Only a return to a methodological 
“subjective” thinking that suspends the scientific mode of thinking from its founding 
principles can possibly provide the principle of all principles of thought and properly 
sanction modern science as such. 
Exactly at this point, the Husserlian phenomenological project addresses our cultural 
crisis. It positions modern science—and, by extension, the whole edifice of Western 
- 6 - 
 
metaphysical thinking—at a inconvenient juncture whereby it splits itself in order to 
catch a glimpse of its exact opposite, i.e., that which it could never possibly be, so it 
can, in turn, become that which it truly is. “Subjective” phenomenological thinking 
reviews all modern sciences by transcending and transforming them into something 
that they are not conditioned to recognize, and this alternative un-conditionality 
conditions without exception all modern sciences. As envisioned by Husserl, the 
phenomenological critique of modern sciences does not offer a normative cure to 
defective thinking but rather a painful acknowledgment of an essential disease whose 
hidden pre-dispositions allow and condition its incubation, again and again. However, 
it is also necessary to note that Husserl’s phenomenology itself remains in crisis. It 
designates a subject-world correlation as an uncontaminated ideal, as a transcendental 
but nonetheless unwavering suspension that founds all of our cultural norms. The 
science of phenomenology does not develop in continuity with the other sciences, but 
it claims that it affirmatively justifies them. The rigour of the phenomenological 
method has nothing to do with the rationalist exactness of the natural sciences, but it 
moves towards the direction of abstraction, idealization, and objectification. To put 
simply: Husserl’s phenomenological science does not see itself as a science positioned 
constantly in crisis, and this failure to see itself in crisis is the critical failure that 
makes it remain in crisis. 
 
The crisis that we are currently referring to, therefore, is an unprecedented crisis 
unknown to recorded human history. It is a profound critical failure constituted by an 
enigmatic negligence, which unsuccessfully seeks to establish the primary relation 
between subject, world, and subject-world method, between the presuppositions of 
our cultural order and the critical disorder that ensues. We are talking about a unique 
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collapse where every movement of thought comes to a halt because it fails to think of 
how the crisis is brought about in the first place. It is a crisis of not yet undergoing a 
fundamental crisis, of not yet being altogether able to move. Such a unique crisis 
arises and gets recognized because there already exists a certain pre-recognized 
criterion by virtue of which the crisis as a pure impasse is primarily recognized. But 
this “foundational” criterion is not to be founded as a self-identical or a self-
differential ideal topos that exists outside of the critical bifurcation. Instead, it is the 
very constitution of a recognition that is critical within a locus of an un-recognizable 
crisis. It is a prima facie recognition that fails and yet gets succeeded at the same time. 
It is a ridiculous circulation, a nonsensical farce, a laughable “turning point 
[μεταβολὴ]” which marks a founding movement with no proceedings. 
We, then, as post-phenomenologists, as post-thinkers of a critique of scientific 
thought, need to preserve the sense of urgency and emergency that every sort of crisis 
demands. We need to revisit and revise, again and again, thinking, may that be 
scientific, phenomenological, or other. We need to treat any and every affirmed 
judgment critically, as a criterion of a crisis, as an intermediary of a perpetual crisis, 
as a proper “διάκρισις”
Concluding Remarks 
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 that does not simply summon a formulated demonstration or 
an idealized abstraction. We need to reread our world’s master-thinkers, scientists and 
philosophers alike, anew with a critical eye and remind ourselves constantly and at all 
times that every judgment is a compromised crisis. We need to become thinkers who 
negotiate a crisis not as a singular issue of a particular order but as an issue of issues 
which affirms itself by constantly articulating itself as an unconditional division of 
itself and its un-recognizable other. 
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We, finally, as young citizens of an ill State of political affairs, of failed policy 
models and bankrupt financial systems that naively relied on the mathematical skills 
of techno-bureaucrats of many sorts, need to reposition judgments made on the crisis 
and reassess decisions taken for the crisis. We need to reclaim the crisis as a 
diacritical issue that generates an unregulated state of intellectual discernment. We 
need to reconsider the crisis not as an affair of the few master-thinkers of our age but 
as the affair of affairs that labours the polis itself, not as a principality of a normative 
order but as an aporetic constitution that inharmoniously effects utopias as well as 
dystopias. We need to rethink our citizenship as a diacrisis in constant crisis and 
reassert it as our unconditional condition that makes a difference. 
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